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With new technological advances, advice can come from different sources such as
machines or humans, but how individuals respond to such advice and the neural
correlates involved need to be better understood. We combined functional MRI
and multivariate Granger causality analysis with an X-ray luggage-screening task to
investigate the neural basis and corresponding effective connectivity involved with
advice utilization from agents framed as experts. Participants were asked to accept
or reject good or bad advice from a human or machine agent with low reliability
(high false alarm rate). We showed that unreliable advice decreased performance
overall and participants interacting with the human agent had a greater depreciation of
advice utilization during bad advice compared to the machine agent. These differences
in advice utilization can be perceivably due to reevaluation of expectations arising
from association of dispositional credibility for each agent. We demonstrated that
differences in advice utilization engaged brain regions that may be associated with
evaluation of personal characteristics and traits (precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex,
temporoparietal junction) and interoception (posterior insula). We found that the right
posterior insula and left precuneus were the drivers of the advice utilization network that
were reciprocally connected to each other and also projected to all other regions. Our
behavioral and neuroimaging results have significant implications for society because of
progressions in technology and increased interactions with machines.
Keywords: expert advice, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), effective connectivity, Granger
causality, precuneus, posterior insula
INTRODUCTION
Individuals often encounter situations in their everyday lives when they must rely on advice
from others. With new technological advances, advice can come from not only humans, but
also automated devices such as a Global Positioning System. For instance, to provide advanced
safety measures, the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) has implemented X-ray luggage
scanners and Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) for screening passengers and exposing
potential security threats (Transportation Safety Administration, 2014). Numerous factors can
alter the valuation of advice, such as self-confidence (Lee and Moray, 1992; Riley, 1996;
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Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006), user trust (Rotter, 1967; Mayer
et al., 1995; Madhavan and Wiegmann, 2007b), source credibility
(i.e., expert) (Birnbaum and Stegner, 1979; Van Swol and
Sniezek, 2005; Madhavan and Wiegmann, 2007a) and source
reliability/performance (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006). Additionally,
advice errors (false alarms and misses) are variables that can
impact decision-making behaviors during advice taking. A false
alarm, or an incorrect alert, may be more of a nuisance and
not necessarily detrimental, while a miss, or an incorrect alert,
may have more serious consequences such as failing to detect
an explosive device in a suitcase. For instance, false alarms
may cause a “cry wolf effect,” in which individuals may tend to
ignore alerts or not respond to them at all (Wickens et al., 2009;
Breznitz, 2013), while misses may cause changes in attention
allocation strategies (Onnasch et al., 2014). A study comparing
false alarms and misses showed that false alarms may hurt overall
performance compared to misses (Dixon et al., 2007), providing
evidence that there are different perceptions involved with the
different error types. Thus the current study only focused on false
alarms to not mix the error types. Understanding the effects of
error types and how people utilize advice are becoming necessary
to provide useful insight for developing safety measures and for
appropriate guidelines to predict human behaviors.
Individuals may vary in how they respond to advice and
studies have shown that expert advice is more frequently
used (Sniezek et al., 2004) and more persuasive than novice
advice (Jungermann et al., 2005). In addition, people may
respond to advice from automation and humans in similar
ways under the premise of a “perfect automation schema,”
in which an individual believes that automated aids are near
perfect (Dzindolet et al., 2002). Moreover, factors such as
dispositional credibility can alter trust between human and
machine advisors due to differences in personal traits such as
loyalty or benevolence. For example, it has been postulated
that association of dispositional credibility is higher for human
agents due to evaluation of personal traits, while automated
agents may be judged more by performance levels (Madhavan
and Wiegmann, 2007a). However, when expectations of reliable
advice are altered due to disconfirmation evidence about an
advisor’s credibility, decision-making behaviors can be impacted.
For example, consistent with disconfirmation theory (Oliver,
1980) decision-making can be affected by initial confirmatory
experiences, which can be influenced by bad advice (Staudinger
and Buchel, 2013). Furthermore, prior literature on iterative trust
games have indicated that trial-and-error learning can modulate
choices based on feedback (Delgado et al., 2005) and trust
develops over time as reputations are learned and developed
(King-Casas et al., 2005). These findings provide evidence that
initial beliefs and expectations may be updated over time based
upon temporal learning mechanisms.
Despite existing knowledge of the cognitive processes that
affect advice taking, the neural mechanisms and the underlying
effective connectivity network involved with good and bad advice
from human and machine agents framed as experts remains
to be explored. Recent neuroimaging studies have investigated
the role of expert advice during decision-making (Meshi et al.,
2012; Boorman et al., 2013), social learning (Biele et al., 2011;
Staudinger and Buchel, 2013) and disobedience (Suen et al.,
2014). Furthermore, the neural activity involved with assigning
trait and intentions to others (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Mitchell et al., 2006; ), self-attributional processes (Cabanis et al.,
2013), as well as human-robot interactions during an interactive
rock-paper-scissors game (Chaminade et al., 2012) and during
observations of social interactions (Wang and Quadflieg, 2015)
have been investigated. Overall, key regions associated with
the default network (e.g., temporoparietal junction, precuneus,
posterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex) and the
salience network (dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral
insulae) have been identified in playing a role during advice
taking, evaluation of personal traits and during human–robot
interactions (Krach et al., 2008; Engelmann et al., 2009).
We aimed to elucidate the neural basis of advice utilization
from different agents with a between-subjects design and the
corresponding effective connectivity in the underlying brain
network by combining an X-ray luggage-screening task and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with multivariate
Granger causality analysis. The focus of this study was to examine
the impact of false alarms on advice taking behaviors based
on previous evidence that false alarms degrade trust and hurt
overall performance more than misses (Dixon et al., 2007). On
the behavioral level, we hypothesized that unreliable advice would
decrease performance (i.e., accuracy) and advice utilization due
to disconfirming evidence about the agents’ perceived expertise.
We further assumed that advice utilization would decrease more
during bad advice due to disconfirmation evidence stemming
from advice-incongruent experiences (i.e., high false alarm rates)
(Dixon et al., 2007). This adaption in behaviors would be revealed
over time as errors became more apparent due to participants’
reevaluation of the agent’s performance (Skitka et al., 2000).
Given the temporal aspect and iterative nature of the task, the
inclusion of a time factor allows for an understanding of the
influence of time based upon feedback and learning. In addition,
we expected that advice utilization would decrease more for the
machine agent compared to the human agent due to differences
in dispositional credibility between humans and machines
(Madhavan and Wiegmann, 2007a). On the neural level, we first
predicted activation differences in brain regions associated with
attribution of personal traits and dispositions (Harris et al., 2005;
Brosch et al., 2013). Secondly, when comparing the human to
the machine agent during bad advice over time, we expected
regions such as the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex
(Pearson et al., 2011; Cabanis et al., 2013), to be the drivers of
the underlying advice utilization network.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Three studies were conducted according to the ethical
guidelines and principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
For the normative rating study, twenty-three male students [age
(M ± SD) = 24.0 ± 2.6] from George Mason University (GMU)
participated to standardize the X-ray luggage images for the
experimental studies. For the behavioral study, 10 volunteers (six
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males, four females; age = 22.3 ± 2.9) participated to complete
an X-ray luggage-screening task without receiving advice. For
the fMRI study, 24 healthy right-handed volunteers (13 males,
11 females; age = 20.0 ± 2.6) determined by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Right-handedness: 94.5 ± 7.7) (Oldfield,
1971) participated in the X-ray luggage-screening task and
they were randomly assigned to either the human (n = 12) or
machine (n = 12) agent groups for a between-subjects design.
All participants gave written consent approved by GMU’s
Institutional Review Board and received financial compensation
for their participation.
Stimuli
During the normative rating study, the participants rated 320
X-ray images based on three dimensions —clutter (4.1 ± 0.3),
general difficulty (3.5± 0.4), and confidence in finding the target
(3.2 ± 0.6)— based on 7-point Likert scales (1 = very low to
7 = very high) (Madhavan and Gonzalez, 2006). From those
images, 64 (32 target and 32 non-target) images were chosen
for the experimental studies based on the standardized ratings
(Figure 1A).
X-ray Luggage-Screening Task
In the X-ray luggage-screening task, participants were asked to
search for the presence or absence of a knife. In the behavioral
study, participants did not receive advice and performed the
task unassisted; participants in the fMRI study received good
(advice-congruent) and bad (advice-incongruent) advice from
either a human or machine agent. For the fMRI study, the
advice was manipulated and the reliability was set to 60% –
good advice: 50% hits (correct alerts) and 10% correct rejections
(correct non-alerts); bad advice: 40% false alarms (incorrect
alerts) (Figure 1B).
On each trial, the participants saw a set of phases including a
fixation cross (0.5 s), advice from one of the agents to “search”
or “clear” the bag (2 s), an image of the X-ray luggage (4 s), a
decision to accept or reject the advice of the agent to “search”
or “clear” the bag (4 s), jitter (∼4 s), feedback indicating if
their decision was correct or incorrect (2.0 s) and lastly, jitter
(∼4 s) (Figure 1C). The jitter times were generated by an fMRI
simulator software1 that optimized the timing and consisted of
a minimum of 1 s, a maximum of 7 s and an average of 4 s.
Participants used response pads to respond and they were given
an initial endowment of $40 and each incorrect answer resulted
in a deduction of $0.30 from the remaining total. Performance,
advice utilization, response times, and monetary deductions were
collected during the experiment. The stimuli were presented
using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc2.).
Procedure
Pre-experimental Phase
The participants came one to 2 weeks before the fMRI experiment
to complete self-report questionnaires as control measures to
investigate individual differences between the agent groups.
1http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/crnl/tools/fmristim
2http://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm
The control measures included: Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI, separate facets of empathy) (Davis, 1983), Complacency-
Potential Rating Scale (, feelings toward automation) (Singh
et al., 1997), National Readiness Technology Scale (NTRS,
embracing new technologies) (Parasuraman, 2000), NEO Five-
Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI, personality styles) (Costa and
McCrae, 1992), and Propensity to Trust (PTT, trust toward
automation) (Merritt et al., 2013).
Experimental Phase
Before participants completed a practice run for the fMRI
experiment, they read descriptions about the human or machine
agents (reliability was not disclosed) (Supplementary Table S1).
They were then asked to rate their trust in and reliability of the
human or machine agent on a 10- point Likert scale (0 = very
low, 10 = very high). During the four trials of the practice
run, participants familiarized themselves with the X-ray luggage-
screening task and the five possible knives that could be present
in the bags. The participants then completed two runs (32 trials
per run) that were randomized of the experimental task while in
the scanner and afterward they were again asked to rate reliability
and trust.
Post-experimental Session
After the fMRI experiment, participants were asked to rate their
confidence in finding the target (i.e., knife) in each of the X-ray
luggage images presented during the fMRI experiment on a 10-
point Likert scale (1= very low, 10= very high).
fMRI Data Acquisition
Imaging data were acquired on a 3 T head-unit only scanner
(Siemens Allegra) with a circularly polarized, transmit/receive
head coil at the Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, GMU,
Virginia. The anatomical imaging data were based on a
3D T1 weighted MPRAGE sequence with TR = 2300 ms,
TE = 3.37 ms, flip angle = 7◦, slice thickness = 1 mm,
voxel dimension = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm and number
of slices = 160. The functional imaging data were based
on a 2D gradient-echo EPI sequence with TR = 2000 ms,
TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 70◦, slice thickness = 3 mm, voxel
dimensions= 3 mm× 3 mm× 3 mm, number of slices= 33 per
volume in an axial orientation parallel to the anterior–posterior
commissure. The first two volumes were discarded to allow for
T1 equilibrium effects and a total of 330 volumes were taken for
each run.
Behavioral Data Analysis
Behavioral data analysis was carried out by Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences 20.0 (SPSS 20.0, IBM Corp.) with alpha
set to p < 0.05 (two-tailed). Data were normally distributed
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov test) and assumptions for analyses of
variance (Bartlett’s test) were not violated. We first investigated
task performance (i.e., accuracy) between the agent groups
and the no agent group by employing one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with Agent (human, machine, no agent)
as the between-subjects factor. Next, we looked at advice
utilization, response times and monetary deductions with mixed
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup. (A) Example stimuli used for the X-ray luggage-screening task. During the normative rating task, participants rated 320 X-ray
luggage images (120 target: 60 high clutter, 60 low clutter; 200 non-target: 100 high clutter, 100 low clutter) that contained everyday objects (hair-dryers, clothes,
etc.) and a possible target present (five different knives, with one possible per image) based on clutter, difficulty and confidence in finding the knife. (B) Decision
matrix. Breakdown for each advice type given during the experiment. (C) X-ray luggage-screening task. During each trial, participants would first see a fixation cross,
advice from one of the agents to “search” or “clear” the bag, an image of the X-ray luggage bag, a decision to accept or reject the advice of the agent to “search” or
“clear” the bag, fixation crosses, feedback indicating if their decision was correct or incorrect and lastly, fixation crosses.
2 × 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs with Advice (good, bad)
and Time (run 1, run 2) as within-subjects factors and Agent
(human, machine) as the between-subjects factor. In addition, we
investigated reliability, trust and confidence ratings with mixed
2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs with Time (pre, post) as the
within-subjects factor for the reliability/trust ratings and Target
(yes, no) as the within-subjects factor for the confidence ratings
and with Agent (human, machine) as the between-subjects factor.
Lastly, we performed independent samples t-tests between the
agent groups to investigate group differences.
fMRI Data Analysis
The fMRI data analysis was carried out using NeuroElf
software3 and BrainVoyager QX 2.8 (Brain Innovation). The
functional imaging data were preprocessed using Statistical
Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8, Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology) functions batched via NeuroElf, including
three-dimensional motion correction (six parameters), slice-
scan time correction (temporal interpolation) and a mean
3http://neuroelf.net
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functional image was computed for each participant across all
runs. The mean functional image was then co-registered with
the anatomical images using a joint-histogram for the different
contrast types. Preprocessing of the anatomical images included
segmenting images with a unified segmentation procedure
(Ashburner and Friston, 2005) and spatial warping were applied
to the functional data to normalize the data to a standard
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain template. Lastly,
spatial smoothing (Gaussian filter of 6 mm FWHM) was applied
to the images to account for any residual differences across
participants. A general linear model (GLM) that was corrected
for first-order serial correlations was performed (Friston et al.,
2003). The GLM consisted of 36 regressors based on advice
utilization (accept, reject) separated by advice (good, bad) and
time (run 1, run 2) for each of the five phases (fixation, advice,
bag, decision, and feedback) on each trial of the X-ray luggage-
screening task and six parametric regressors of no interest for the
3D motion correction (translations in X, Y, Z directions, rotations
around X, Y, Z axes). The regressor time courses were adjusted
for the hemodynamic response delay by convolution with a dual-
gamma canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF; Buchel
et al., 1998). Random-effect analyses were performed at the multi-
subject level to explore brain regions associated with the decision
and feedback phases.
To reveal brain activations associated with advice utilization,
mixed 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs on parameter estimates were applied
with Advice (good, bad) and Time (run 1, run 2) as within-
subjects factors and Agent (human, machine) as the between-
subjects factor. For the fMRI results, our main focus was on
brain activations during the decision and feedback phases for the
three-way interaction since our a priori hypotheses was based
on the interaction of three factors (advice, time, and agent).
However, additional analyses were performed on the main effects
for the decision and feedback phases (see Additional Analyses).
Activations for the decision and feedback phases were reported
after correcting for multiple comparisons using a cluster-level
statistical threshold (Cluster-level Statistical Threshold Estimator
plugin in BrainVoyager QX), which calculates the minimum
cluster size to achieve a false activation probability (α = 0.05)
(Forman et al., 1995; Goebel et al., 2006). The voxel-level
threshold was set at p < 0.005 (uncorrected) and the thresholded
map was used for a whole-brain correction criterion based
on the estimate of the map’s spatial smoothness and on an
iterative procedure (Monte Carlo simulation, 1,000 iterations).
The activation clusters were displayed in MNI space on an
anatomical brain template reversed left to right.
Effective Connectivity Analysis
Investigation of the effective (or directional) brain connectivity
in the network of activated brain regions was performed through
multivariate Granger causality analysis (GCA) using a custom
MATLAB4 code as previously described by Grant et al. (2014);
Kapogiannis et al. (2014) and Lacey et al. (2014). Granger
causality is based on a temporal precedence concept (Granger,
1969) that can be applied to multivariate effective connectivity
4www.mathworks.com
modeling of ROI (region of interest) time courses to predict
directional influences among brain regions (Friston et al., 2003;
Deshpande et al., 2009; Strenziok et al., 2010; Preusse et al.,
2011; Sathian et al., 2011). The model examines the relationship
of variables in time, such that given two variables, a and b,
if past values of a better predict the present value of b, then
causality between the variables can be inferred as function of
their earlier time points (Roebroeck et al., 2005; Hampstead et al.,
2011; Krueger et al., 2011). GCA is advantageous for application
of effective connectivity since it is a data-driven approach and
there is no requirement for pre-specified connectivity models like
dynamic causal modeling (DCM) (Friston et al., 2003; Roebroeck
et al., 2005; Deshpande et al., 2009, 2012; Deshpande and
Hu, 2012). Recent GCA investigations, including experimental
applications (Abler et al., 2006) as well as simulations (Deshpande
et al., 2010b; Wen et al., 2013), have shown its advantages and
validity for assessing effective connectivity.
Based upon on effective connectivity hypotheses, only those
regions that survived the fMRI analysis threshold for the
interaction effect Advice (good, bad), Time (run 1, run 2), and
Agent (human, machine) for the decision phase were selected
as ROIs for the subsequent multivariate GCA. Time series of
the BOLD (blood-oxygen-level-dependent) signal for the selected
ROIs were extracted around peak activation maxima (sphere
of 6 mm × 6 mm × 6 mm), averaged across voxels and
normalized across participants, per run. Blind hemodynamic
deconvolution of the mean ROI BOLD time series was performed
using a Cubature Kalman filter, which has been shown to be
extremely efficient for jointly estimating latent neural signals and
the spatially variable HRFs (Havlicek et al., 2011). In addition,
recent research has shown that this model is not susceptible to
over-fitting and produces estimates that are comparable to non-
parametric methods (Sreenivasan et al., 2015). Hemodynamic
deconvolution removes the inter-subject and inter-regional
variability of the HRF (Handwerker et al., 2004) as well as its
smoothing effect and therefore, increases the effective temporal
resolution of the signal. The resulting latent neural signals were
entered into a first order dynamic multivariate autoregressive
(dMVAR) model for assessing directed interactions between
multiple nodes as a function of time (Wheelock et al., 2014;
Grant et al., 2015; Hutcheson et al., 2015) while factoring
out influences mediated indirectly in the set of selected ROIs
(Stilla et al., 2007; Deshpande et al., 2008, 2010a). A first
order model was implemented because of the interest in causal
influences arising from neural delays, which are less than a
TR (Deshpande et al., 2013). Furthermore, the dMVAR model’s
coefficients were allowed to vary as a function of time. Therefore,
directional connectivity between selected ROIs can be estimated
using the dMVAR model coefficients at each specific time
instant. Since the experimental design consists of conditions
of interest as well as inter-trial rest intervals, condition-specific
connectivity values can be obtained as sample distributions
by aggregating model coefficients corresponding to all time
instants for specific conditions (Sathian et al., 2013; Grant
et al., 2014, 2015; Lacey et al., 2014; Wheelock et al., 2014;
Hutcheson et al., 2015; Feng et al., 2016). Granger connectivity
(GC) path weights, i.e., the model coefficients, for conditions
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of interest (bad advice) for each agent (human, machine) were
extracted.
Those corresponding GC path weights were populated into
two samples and independent samples t-tests were employed
to reveal the condition-specific modulations of connectivity
[q(FDR) < 0.05) (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995), i.e., those
paths which had significantly different effective connectivity
between human and machine agents while receiving bad advice
(Figure 2). Since GCA is a data-driven approach, the condition-
specific modulation was specifically chosen for analysis based
upon our fMRI results. Effective connectivity of brain regions
(i.e., nodes, edges) was displayed on a brain surface using
BrainNet Viewer (www.nitrc.org/projects/bnv/), a graphical
interface visualization tool (Xia et al., 2013). Lastly, we performed
bivariate Spearman’s correlations to identify associations between
behavioral measures (i.e., advice utilization) and GC path weights
for the human- and machine-agent groups.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
First, we compared the performance between the agent groups
and the no advice group by employing a one-way ANOVA
with Agent (human, machine, no agent) as between-subjects
factors. A significant main effect of Agent [F(2,31) = 13.85,
p < 0.0001] was revealed, and post hoc testing revealed that
the no agent group performed better than the human-agent
group [t(20) = −4.06, p = 0.001] and the machine-agent group
[t(20)=−4.54, p < 0.0001]. (Figure 3A).
Next, we looked at advice utilization, response times, and
monetary deductions For advice utilization, a significant main
effect of Advice was revealed [F(1,22) = 7.63, p = 0.011],
indicating that participants accepted good advice more than
bad advice. In addition, a significant three-way interaction
of Advice × Time × Agent was identified [F(1,22) = 5.06,
p = 0.035], but no significant main effects of Agent
[F(1,22) = 0.65, p = 0.429] or Time [F(1,22) = 2.30, p = 0.144]
and no significant two-way interaction effects of Advice× Agent
[F(1,22) = 0.56, p = 0.463], Time × Agent [F(1,22) = 2.54,
p = 0.125], and Advice × Time [F(1,22) = 0.40, p = 0.536]
(Figure 3B) were found. Follow-up 2 × 2 ANOVAs showed
a significant interaction effect of Time × Agent for bad
advice [F(1,22) = 5.63, p = 0.027], but not for good advice
[F(1,22) = 1.23, p = 0.279]. Follow-up independent samples
t-tests revealed that the human-agent group accepted bad advice
less than the machine-agent group during run 2 [t(22) = −1.84,
p= 0.040].
In addition, we looked at pre- and post-experiment ratings
(reliability, trust) using repeated-measures ANOVAs with Time
(run 1, run 2) and Agent (human, machine) as factors.
The reliability ratings showed no significant main effect
of Agent [F(1,22) = 0.62, p = 0.439], but a significant
main effect of Time [F(1,22) = 6.54, p = 0.018] and a
significant interaction effect of Time × Agent [F(1,22) = 7.86,
p = 0.010] (Figure 4A). Post hoc testing revealed that the
human agent’s pre-reliability was rated higher than the machine’s
FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustrating the effective connectivity analysis
pipeline.
pre-reliability [t(22) = 2.87, p = 0.009] and the human’s
reliability ratings decreased from pre- to post-experiment
[t(11) = 4.10, p = 0.002]. Furthermore, one-sample t-tests
on perceived versus actual reliability (60%) of the agent
showed that pre-reliability ratings were significantly higher
than the actual reliability for the human agent [t(11) = 6.79
p < 0.0001].
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FIGURE 3 | Behavioral results for decision phase (M ± SEM). (A) Task
performance. The no agent group performed better than human- and
machine-agent groups. (B) Advice utilization. Advice utilization during bad
advice from the human agent was significantly lower during run 2 compared
to the machine agent.
For trust ratings, no significant main effects of Agent
[F(1,22) = 0.26, p = 0.615] and Time [F(1,22) = 3.96,
p = 0.059] were observed, but a significant interaction effect of
Time × Agent [F(1,22) = 5.89, p = 0.026] was demonstrated
(Figure 4B). Post hoc testing revealed that trust ratings
significantly decreased from pre- to post-experiment for the
human agent [t(11)= 4.18, p= 0.002].
Neuroimaging Results
For the fMRI results, we looked at brain activations during
the decision and feedback phases for the three-way interaction.
For the decision phase, a significant three-way interaction
effect (α < 0.05, k = 21) was found in the right (R)
posterior insula (PI) (BA 13); R anterior precuneus (aPreC)
(BA 5/7), left (L) aPreC (BA 5/7); L posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC) (BA 30/31); L rostrolateral prefrontal cortex
(rlPFC) (superior frontal gyrus: SFG; BA 10); and L posterior
temporoparietal junction (pTPJ) (superior temporal gyrus: STG;
BA 22) (Figure 5; Table 1). The results indicate that there
was higher activation during run 1 for the human-agent group
compared to machine-agent group during bad advice. For the
feedback phase, a significant three-way interaction (α < 0.05,
k = 14) was found in the L dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
FIGURE 4 | Results for ratings (M ± SEM). (A) Pre- and Post-reliability.
Pre-reliability was higher for the human agent compared to the machine
agent. For the human agent, perceived pre-reliability was significantly higher
than the actually reliability of the agent (60%) and post-reliability ratings
significantly decreased. (B) Pre- and post-trust. Post-trust was significantly
lower than pre-trust for the human agent.
(dmPFC) (medial frontal gyrus: MFG; BA 9/10) showing
higher activation for the human agent during run 2 for good
compared to bad advice (Figure 6; Table 1). Note that no
further post hoc comparisons were performed on the extracted
data from the decision or feedback phases to avoid non-
independent analyses, or double dipping (Kriegeskorte et al.,
2009).
Effective Connectivity Results
Based on our fMRI results, we implemented multivariate
GCA to identify effective connectivity among brain regions
during the decision phase when comparing the human
with the machine agent during bad advice for run 1 [all
connections survived q(FDR) < 0.05, except the connections
to the L rlPFC that survived q(FDR) < 0.08] (Table 2).
Analysis for the feedback phase was not done due to the
fact that only one region survived for the fMRI results.
The L aPreC and PI were identified as the source ROIs;
they were the drivers of the network making reciprocal
connections to each other, while also both sending output
connections to all target ROIs (R aPreC, PCC, rlPFC, and
pTPJ) (Figure 7). The correlation analysis for advice utilization
and GC path weights for both groups revealed no significant
results.
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FIGURE 5 | Brain activations during decision phase (α < 0.05, k = 21). The three-way interaction (Advice × Run × Agent) during the decision phase
significantly activated the right posterior insula (PI), right anterior precuneus (aPreC), left aPreC, left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex
(rlPFC), and left posterior temporoparietal junction (pTPJ). The activation pattern indicates higher activation for the human- compared to machine-agent group for
bad advice during run 1. The bar plots shown are for visualization purposes.
Additional Analyses
Behavioral Results
For response times, significant main effects of Advice
[F(1,22) = 12.26, p = 0.002] and Time [F(1,22) = 5.85,
p = 0.024] were found, indicating that responses were faster
during good compared to bad advice and during run 2
compared to run 1 (Supplementary Figure S1a). A marginally
significant interaction effect was found for the interaction of
Time × Agent [F(1,22) = 4.35, p = 0.049], but no significant
main effect of Agent [F(1,22) = 0.49, p = 0.491] and no
significant interaction effects of Advice × Agent [F(1,22) = 0.10,
p = 0.758], Advice × Time [F(1,22) = 0.07, p = 0.798], and
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TABLE 1 | Brain regions associated with the three-way interaction.
F(1,22) value Cluster size (mm3) x y z
Decision phase
(Advice × Run × Agent)
Right posterior insula 32.86 854 36 −15 21
Right anterior precuneus 18.65 593 18 −42 45
Left anterior precuneus 21.52 2214 −6 −42 51
Left posterior cingulate cortex 24.96 607 −3 −63 15
Left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex 17.34 692 −21 45 21
Left posterior temporoparietal junction 23.58 1678 −48 −45 9
Feedback phase
(Advice × Run × Agent)
Left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 25.03 655 −6 51 12
Brain regions showing significant activation clusters associated during the decision (minimum cluster of 21) and feedback (minimum cluster of 14) phases (α < 0.05,
cluster-level threshold corrected). PI, posterior insula (BA 13); aPreC, anterior precuneus (BA 5/7); PCC, posterior cingulate cortex (BA 30/31); rlPFC, rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex (BA 10); pTPJ, posterior temporoparietal junction (BA 22); dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (BA 9/10).
FIGURE 6 | Brain activations during feedback phase (α < 0.05, k = 14).
The three-way interaction (Advice × Run × Agent) during the feedback phase
significantly activated the left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). The
activation pattern shows lower activation for bad advice compared to good
advice during run 2 for the human agent. The bar plots shown are for
visualization purposes.
Advice × Time × Agent [F(1,22) = 0.06, p = 0.811] were
found.
For monetary deductions, a significant main effect of Advice
[F(1,22) = 292.45, p < 0.0001] was revealed, indicating
TABLE 2 | Path weights for Granger causality Analysis.
Path weight
Source Target Human Machine t-value p-value
PI R aPreC 0.23 0.18 4.06 2.80 × 10−5
L aPreC 0.18 0.19 2.57 5.16 × 10−3
PCC 0.27 0.18 3.96 4.16 × 10−5
rlPFC 0.16 0.18 2.32 1.04 × 10−2
pTPJ 0.17 0.15 2.52 6.02 × 10−3
L aPreC PI 0.18 −0.17 2.42 7.80 × 10−3
R aPreC 0.18 −0.12 2.44 7.51 × 10−3
PCC 0.20 −0.15 3.47 2.79 × 10−4
rlPFC 0.16 −0.15 2.01 2.22 × 10−2
pTPJ 0.24 −0.21 3.12 9.39 × 10−4
The path weights displayed show significant effective connectivity paths that are
stronger in the human-agent group compared to the machine-agent group during
run 1 [all connections survived q(FDR) < 0.05, except the connection to rlPFC that
survived q(FDR) < 0.08]. The directionality of the connectivity is shown in the first
two columns, with the source column showing the ROIs that predict activation in
the target column ROIs. The strength of connectivity is given by the mean path
weights in the third column. PI, posterior insula; aPreC, anterior precuneus; PCC,
posterior cingulate cortex; rlPFC, rostrolateral prefrontal cortex; pTPJ, posterior
temporoparietal junction.
that deductions were higher during bad advice compared
to good advice (Supplementary Figure S1b). In addition, a
marginally significant interaction effect of Time × Agent
was found [F(1,22) = 4.61, p = 0.043], but no significant
main effects of Time [F(1,22) = 0.31, p = 0.583] and
Agent [F(1,22) = 1.56, p = 0.224], or interaction effects of
Advice × Agent [F(1,22) = 0.10, p = 0.758], Advice × Time
[F(1,22) = 0.10, p = 0.921], and Advice × Time × Agent
[F(1,22)= 0.09, p= 0.768] were found.
For confidence ratings, no main effect of Agent [F(1,22)= 4.16,
p = 0.054] or significant interaction effect of Target × Agent
[F(1,22) = 2.46, p = 0.131] were found, but a significant main
effect of Target [F(1,22) = 53.44, p < 0.0001] was revealed,
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FIGURE 7 | Results for multivariate Granger causality analysis. The
effective connectivity network for bad advice during the decision phase for run
1 when comparing the human with machine agent showed that the PI
(posterior insula) and L aPreC (anterior precuneus) were drivers of the network
and also the source ROIs for all other target ROIs (R aPreC, PCC posterior
cingulate cortex), rlPFC (rostrolateral prefontal cortex), and pTPJ (posterior
temporoparietal junction). Note that all connections survived q(FDR) < 0.05,
except the connections to rlPFC that survived q(FDR) < 0.08. The color bar
represents the t-value of the comparisons shown in Table 2.
indicating that confidence was rated higher on target bags
compared to non-target bags (Supplementary Figure S2).
Finally, we analyzed at differences in control measures (e.g.,
demographic measures and questionnaires) with independent
samples t-tests. No significant group differences were identified
for any of the control measures (Supplementary Table S2).
Neuroimaging Results
Further contrasts were performed for advice (good, bad), decision
(accept, reject) and performance (correct, incorrect). For the
main effect of advice during the decision phase, a significant
cluster (α < 0.05, k = 21) was revealed in the right orbitofrontal
cortex (superior frontal gyrus, BA 11). For the feedback phase,
significant activation clusters for the main effect of advice were
found in right middle frontal gyrus (BA 6/8), right superior
parietal lobule (BA 7), right putamen, right posterior cingulate
cortex (BA 30), right head of the caudate, left orbitofrontal cortex
(medial frontal gyrus, BA 11), left precentral gyrus (BA 4), left
subcallosal gyrus (BA 34), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (middle frontal gyrus, BA 46) and
left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) (Supplementary Table S3).
For decision (accept > reject) during the decision phase
(α < 0.05, k = 34), significant activation clusters were found in
the right superior temporal gyrus (BA 41), right inferior parietal
lobule (BA 40), right postcentral gyrus (BA 3), right precentral
gyrus (BA 4), right lingual gyrus (BA 18), left cingulate gyrus (BA
24), left postcentral gyrus (BA 5), left superior temporal gyrus (BA
22) (Supplementary Table S4).
For performance (correct > incorrect) during the feedback
phase (α < 0.05, k = 57), significant activation clusters were
shown in the right inferior parietal lobule (BA 40), right frontal
eye fields (middle frontal gyrus, BA 8), right middle occipital
gyrus (BA 18), right putamen, right cingulate gyrus (BA 31),
left frontal eye fields (BA 8), left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(middle frontal gyrus, BA 46), left inferior occipital gyrus (BA 18),
left angular gyrus (BA 39) (Supplementary Table S5).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research was to understand the neural
basis and corresponding effective connectivity network involved
during advice utilization from human and machine agents
framed as experts. To provide a greater understanding of the
behavioral and neural underpinnings associated with advice
taking, we manipulated agent reliability with a high false
alarm rate to reveal the decision-making processes during
good and bad advice. We first revealed that unreliable advice
decreased performance, which has been previously reported by
other behavioral studies investigating advice differences between
humans and machines (Dzindolet et al., 2002; Madhavan and
Wiegmann, 2007a). An earlier study investigating credibility
found that advice utilization decreased for expert automation
but not for expert humans; however, this study focused entirely
on misses and false alarms, which could account for any
differences between these earlier findings and ours (Madhavan
and Wiegmann, 2007a). In addition, a study investigating
perception during a contrast-detection task showed that false
alarms evoked more cortical activity when compared to misses,
which supports the notion that participants’ percepts may vary
when presented with different types of errors (Ress and Heeger,
2003). In our study, we focused only on false alarms since there
is evidence of distinct neuronal activity associated with false
alarms when compared to misses and behavioral studies have
demonstrated differences between the two error types (Dixon
et al., 2007; McBride et al., 2014).
Contradictory to our hypothesis, the behavioral results
revealed that the decline in advice utilization was greater for
the human agent compared to the machine agent. We expected
that advice utilization would degrade faster for the machine
agent because of differences in association of dispositional
credibility; however, our results indicate that false alarms
weighed more heavily on the human-agent group. Our findings
provide evidence that although assignment of personal traits
may have been higher for the human agent, the prevalence
of false alarms may have altered evaluations of performance
levels due to the type of error presented. Furthermore, to
reveal any preconceived notions that participants had about the
human and machine agents, we examined whether the perceived
pre-reliability differed from the actual reliability for each
agent. Interestingly, the human agent’s pre-reliability was rated
significantly higher than the actual reliability, showing that the
human-agent group expected their advisor to be more reliable.
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Our finding supports other behavioral studies that indicate that
preconceived notions can influence participants’ perceptions of
advice (Madhavan and Wiegmann, 2007b). Furthermore, these
findings indicate that participants interacting with the human
agent could have perceivably built a mental model of their
expectations about the agent’s credibility and deviations from
expected behavior likely caused a reevaluation of the human
agent’s performance (Burgoon, 1993). The change in perspectives
would ultimately cause a shift toward self-reliance and possibly
increased responsibility/accountability for the outcome of their
decisions (Dzindolet et al., 2002). Post-reliability ratings for the
human-agent group showed a shift toward the actual reliability
of the agent, which indicates that the human-agent group was
able to discern the agent’s performance and recalibrate their
expectations. Moreover, post-trust was lower than pre-trust for
human agent, supporting previous evidence that false alarms
degrade trust (Dixon et al., 2007; Rice and McCarley, 2011).
Lastly, our results cannot be explained by any of our control
measures or confidence ratings because we found no differences
between the agent groups.
Moreover, our results revealed that advice utilization
decreased during bad advice compared to good advice. Since
bad advice was advice-incongruent, it could have created a
mismatch between what the participants perceived and what
they were advised, resulting in disconfirmation experiences.
The discrepancies during advice-disconfirmation experiences
most likely lead to skepticism during bad advice and ultimately
degradation of advice utilization. As a consequence, response
times for both groups were slower during bad advice, since
participants had more conflicting perceptual processes (advice-
incongruencies). In addition, monetary deductions were higher
overall for bad advice, indicating that bad advice caused
participants to make more erroneous decisions.
Subsequently, we identified the neural basis and effective
connectivity of the underlying brain network associated with
advice utilization. On the neural level, we had two expectations
regarding brain activity. First, we expected activation differences
in regions associated with attribution of personal traits and
dispositions, (Harris et al., 2005; Brosch et al., 2013), and
secondly, when comparing the agent groups during bad advice
over time, brain regions such as the precuneus and posterior
cingulate cortex would be the drivers of the advice utilization
network. Our neuroimaging results revealed brain regions
associated with domain-general large-scale networks, such as
the default-mode network (left pTPJ, bilateral aPreC, left PCC)
typically engaged in social evaluations, the salience network (AI)
with the PI interaction for detection of internal and external
salient events, and the central-executive network (left rlPFC)
implicated in higher-order executive functions (Menon, 2011).
Similarly to our fMRI hypotheses, on the effective connectivity
level, we theorized that a network to be differentially involved
when comparing the human to the machine agent for bad
advice during run 1. Our effective connectivity analysis revealed
that left aPreC and PI were drivers of the network that were
reciprocally connected to each other. The aPreC and PI acted as
centralized hubs of the network, presumably by integrating social
evaluations (e.g., judgments about other’s intentions and personal
traits) (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006) with interoception (e.g.,
recruitment of physiological responses to environmental cues)
(Kurth et al., 2010). Previous evidence supports the notion that
integration of subjective mental states (PreC) and information
about internal bodily states (anterior insula, AI) are important for
awareness of one’s emotional state (Terasawa et al., 2013). Since
participants interacting with the human agent could have had
greater conceptualization of the discrepancies between the actual
and perceived reliability, this could have led to evaluations about
accepting or rejecting the unreliable advice due to interoception
(PI) (Engelmann et al., 2009; Menon and Uddin, 2010; Xue
et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2012) in conjunction with association of
personal traits (aPreC) during interactions with the agent.
Furthermore, our effective connectivity results indicated that
both hubs (left aPreC, PI) had directional influences on all
other regions (right aPreC, left pTPJ, PCC, and left rlPFC) to
guide decision-making processes during advice utilization. PreC
activation has been identified during a comparison of other- vs.
self-attribution, showing the involvement of this region during
causal attributions toward another (Farrer and Frith, 2002).
In addition, PCC activation has been implicated in adapting
behaviors (Pearson et al., 2011) and self-reflection (Johnson et al.,
2002), while the pTPJ has been shown to be activated during
social cognitions such as determining intentionality of others
(Mars et al., 2012). Furthermore, we found directional influences
to the rlPFC, which is part of the central-executive network and
has shown to be involved in reasoning (Christoff et al., 2001) and
while making uncertain decisions (Badre et al., 2012).
During advice taking, individuals may decide to discount or
utilize the advice given to them and this can vary depending
on different factors such as the source or type of advice. For
instance, studies investigating tracking of expertise for humans
and algorithms (Boorman et al., 2013) and perceptions of
competence during advice evaluations (Schilbach et al., 2013)
found areas associated with the mentalizing network and salience
networks (e.g., ACC, precuneus). Our fMRI results provide a
greater discernment of the distinct mental processes involved
during advice acceptance from different sources of advice and
the behavioral changes that occurred with each agent (e.g., less
degradation of advice utilization with the machine agent). One
way in which fMRI can inform us about cognitive processes
is by allowing us to compare two tasks to determine if they
engage similar or distinct mental processes (Mather et al., 2013).
Our findings showed that behaviorally, participants responded
differently to each agent and similarly, our fMRI findings also
demonstrated that distinct mental mechanisms were involved
during advice taking with each agent. The fact that there was
coinciding brain activity along with behavioral responses for both
the human and machine agent points to different mechanistic
processes when participants utilize advice from different sources.
Furthermore, other fMRI studies investigating expert advice have
shown activation in PCC and PreC during no advice conditions
(Engelmann et al., 2009) and in regions such as PCC, insula
and medial frontal gyrus when comparing advice vs. no advice
in experts and peers (Suen et al., 2014); however, we did not
expect equivalent results since our experimental design looked at
differences between humans and machines.
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In addition to our results for the decision phase, we also
expected participants to have a heightened awareness of bad
advice due to feedback, which would ultimately lead to a
behavioral adjustment in advice utilization over time. During
the feedback phase, we found activation in the dmPFC, which
coincides with another study that showed dmPFC activity during
feedback after iterative trials with the same advisor (Behrens
et al., 2008). The dmPFC has been shown to be involved with
social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006) and during inferences
about other’s goals and traits (Krueger et al., 2008; Van Overwalle,
2009). In our study, participants interacting with the human
agent showed lower dmPFC activation during bad compared to
good advice toward the end of the experiment, which shows that,
as participants ascertained that the human agent was unreliable,
they could have placed lower value on bad advice while receiving
feedback.
Our study had a few limitations that should be addressed.
First, we looked at differences between good and bad advice
by manipulating agent reliability with only false alarms. Future
studies could elaborate on our findings by investigating how
misses degrade advice utilization between humans and machines
and the effective connectivity network associated with those
differences. Furthermore, to prevent cognitive anchoring, or the
tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information
acquired, we had participants receive advice before they made
their decisions, rather than receiving advice after they made
their decisions. Cognitive anchoring has been shown to decrease
reliance on automated aids during self-generated decisions
(Madhavan and Wiegmann, 2005) and future studies could
investigate this phenomena by implementing a paradigm where
participants receive advice after they make their decisions.
Additionally, our sample size was on the lower side (given that we
had a between-subjects design) and future studies could include
more participants. Increasing the sample size would allow future
studies to incorporate an analysis like a Bayesian learning model
to provide greater insight into participant’s learning patterns.
Moreover, in our study, learning occurred rapidly due to feedback
and thus a learning model was not feasible for our analysis.
Future study paradigms could directly compare learning models
to assess any differences in adaptive behaviors. Lastly, our voxel-
level threshold was set at p < 0.005, and while recent evidence
has shown that false positive rates may be particularly high at that
threshold (Eklund et al., 2016), future studies need to assess other
fMRI software packages (e.g., BrainVoyager) to see if the same
question of validity arises.
In summary, our findings provide extensive insight into
underlying factors involved with advice utilization from humans
and machines and the differences that account for those
behaviors. Our results have significant implications for society
because of progressions in technology and increased interactions
with machines. A greater discernment of the various facets
involved with machine interactions will ultimately serve to
calibrate behavioral responses and to optimize future safety
guidelines. For instance, there could be training protocols
designed for both individuals giving and receiving advice.
Advisors could be trained to have high search rates for bags
(higher false alarms/lower misses), while advisees could be
trained to have greater vigilance (less reliance) to minimize
complacent behaviors, which can result in higher miss rates.
By providing the appropriate training, this can help to improve
security measures and ultimately prevent potential catastrophic
disasters.
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